FOR DECADES, historians of America and Europe have been attentive to some of the ways in which film history might offer access to general socio-historical questions. In both teaching and research, movies and other popular media have for some time been seen as barometers of changing social norms and values. More recently, they have been analyzed not merely as mirrors of society but as cultural products that themselves have had an active role in representing, but also enforcing or even constituting, visions of society and of history.1 Implicit in this shift is an understanding that the place of film within our discipline is not only an important but a complex one: that the reciprocal relations among creators, financiers, regulators, and spectators of movies cannot be reduced to a simple formula. How can we use film, in research or in teaching, to engage historical questions? What sort of questions can be answered by such analysis, and what methods must be employed to answer them?
1.
6 Linda Schulte-Sasse, Entertaining the Third Reich: Illusions of Wholeness in Nazi Cinema (Durham, N.C., 1996). 7 Critical reassessments of the entertainment/propaganda dichotomy in relation to film in this period can be found in German-language publications such as Stephen Lowry, Pathos und Politik: Ideologie in Spielfilmen des Nationalsozialismus (Tubingen, 1991); Leonardo Quaresima, "Der Film im Dritten Reich: Moderne, Amerikanismus, Unterhaltungsfilm," montage/av 3, no. 2 (1994): 5-22; and especially the work of Karsten Witte; but the reception of this work by historians of National Socialism in Germany is even more marginal than on this side of the Atlantic. Lowry's position, discussed at greater length below, is offered in English in the article "Fascist Film or Unpolitical Entertainment?" New German Critique, no. 74 (Spring-Summer 1998): 125-49, where he argues that the search for political content in these films "often stifles a complete and more differentiated assessment of the conceived in a rather monolithic, stable, and unidirectional way, disseminated from the top down, indoctrinating audiences and publics. This way of looking at ideology and German film was prepared by Siegfried Kracauer's study of proto-fascist or authoritarian themes in the Weimar cinema, From Caligari to Hitler (1947), and led to Erwin Leiser's documentary film and book Germany, Awake in 1968.10 Leiser's work should be acknowledged as an important precursor to more recent film and ideology studies in that it set out to break down the boundary between propaganda and entertainment film, albeit only by dismissing the possibility of diversion from or resistance to Nazi propaganda within films produced under the regime. Hence Leiser claimed that although only about one-sixth of the over 1,000 feature films produced in the Third Reich were "straight political propaganda" (certainly an overestimate), nonetheless "every film had a political function.""1 These statements and the analyses they yielded depended on assumptions of an exact isomorphism of several spheres that were, in fact, each constantly shifting and elusive, so that their perfect coincidence would have been impossible. These supposedly coincident spheres were Nazi ideology qua doctrine, the Nazi propaganda apparatus (including the Propaganda Ministry [RMVP] as well as the co-opted film industry), and the representational space of the films produced between 1933 and 1945.
In contrast to Leiser's assumption of ubiquitous ideological messages, David Stewart Hull's Film in the Third Reich: Art and Propaganda in Nazi Germany (1969) divorced the aesthetic and entertainment value of movies from their ideological content, or even posited the subversive potential of entertainment films. This position, too, was enabled by a view of ideology that focused on directed propaganda. The elision between stated programs (especially those of Goebbels) and cinematic practice was most apparent of all in the work of David Welch, whose 1983 monograph Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933-1945 did much to explore the centrality of the film industry to Goebbels's ideological mission, without, however, acknowledging the complexity and internal contradictions of both that ideological project and its presumed execution.12 Welch's edited anthology Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations (1983), as the title implies, did question the degree of ideological saturation effected by the Nazi cinema, but it still depended on the founding structural model of a coherent propaganda program disseminated to the masses through the vehicle of Nazi propaganda films and features. This reduction of ideological fields of meaning to indoctrination is already suggested by the Hitler quotation that serves as the epigram to Welch's introduction: "Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda. All that matters is propaganda." '13 In intellectual history, the landmark 1960s studies of George Mosse and Fritz Stern provided genealogies of "Volkish" thought.14 These immensely influential works offered readers doctrinal contexts that allowed National Socialist antiSemitism to be seen as something other than the aberrant obsession of a psychologically unstable fringe. In retrospect, however, these works seem to have reinforced a rigid dichotomy of enlightened Western thought pitted against a reactive rebellion. Furthermore, they contributed to a view that tended to treat Volkish ideology as a consistent and self-contained body of thought. The same assumption of self-containment can be discerned in what came to be a governing dichotomy in Nazi historiography: the conflict between so-called "intentionalist" and "functionalist" explanations of Nazi policy, most importantly the state's approach to the "Jewish question."'15 The ordering of such explanations according to a view of the centrality of Hitler and his radical anti-Semitic personal ideology, on the one hand, or of his relative weakness in a structurally decentered system, where ideological radicalization emerged as an effect of factional competition, on the other, is only possible with the reduction of the notion of ideology to an institutionally sponsored doctrinal program. The question itself betrays a programmatic definition of ideology-to posit an opposition between "intention" and "function" presupposes this very specific understanding of ideology as fully self-conscious and internally consistent.
Sophisticated approaches to this level of "ideology" have been anything but foreign to historians. Practitioners of our discipline have in fact been at the forefront of research into the complexities of official ideology, especially the racialist foundations of Nazi society and its troubled relationship to the concept of modernity, as well as the modernist roots of the "final solution."'16 The question of "consent" and "resistance"-the forms such activities could take beyond the categories of collaboration and sabotage-has entered the field with a vengeance, with extremely provocative effects.17 Among the insights to come out of such work 13 is the notion that collusion and resistance can coexist, or that certain forms of resistance are built into or are produced by the repressive ideology itself. At the same time, in film and media criticism, the compendium of approaches that has come to be identified as "cultural studies" has opened inquiry into popular culture as a locus of ideological imposition as well as subversion; various reading strategies bring out the holes in the textual fabric, the multiple valences of narrative and rhetoric in the filmic text, and produce a generally much more varied picture of the way ideological meanings are produced, mediated, and received than we had before.
Finally, in the wake of the extraordinary popular reception of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners and, most recently (if less dramatically), the English-language editions of German-Jewish academic Victor Klemperer's diaries from the years of Nazi rule, the question of the degree of ideological saturation within German society has become central, with a particular focus on anti-Semitism.18 In Goldhagen's book, "ideology" is a term that does not appear on its own in the index, and he employs it exclusively in the sense of a specific program moving toward the Holocaust: "genocidal ideology," or "eliminationist ideology." He introduces the term "eliminationist antisemitism" to cover a set of notions about Jews explicitly linked to the goal of their eradication from German society, and he makes the claim that this "eliminationist ideology" was in place long before Hitler came to power. This reductive account of anti-Semitism was a primary object of attack by scholars of Germany, and even Goldhagen himself later deemphasized this aspect of his book, which was obviously never meant to serve as an intellectual history of anti-Jewish thought.19 Ironically, the question of the role of ideology in the violent history of the Third Reich would thus be raised in force through the lens of a view of German anti-Semitism less differentiated than the intellectual histories of the 1960s.
In the wake of scholarly attacks on Goldhagen's thesis, methods, and analysis, the most extreme functionalists acted as though the book conclusively discredited causal accounts of Nazi policy focused on anti-Semitic ideology. It was perhaps in reaction to this turn of the Goldhagen reception that several highly regarded intellectuals came to his defense, stressing the merits of a view that acknowledged the inescapable question of the place of the Jew in modern German cultural fantasy (as opposed to the function of anti-Semitism within National Socialist rhetoric, Schulte-Sasse's book on Nazi entertainment film takes a more explicitly psychoanalytic approach to ideology informed by the work of Slavoj Zizek and Jacques Lacan. She, too, notes of these figures that "they are each other's Other and cannot exist independently."24 As "dialectical opposites," they cannot exist without one another. Her essay on Jew Suss does several things at once, but in reference to this issue of anti-Semitic ideology it provides specific textual evidence for an abstract operation Zizek has described in The Sublime Object of Ideology. This operation is the so-called "identification with the symptom," whereby the racist subject recognizes the Jew as the necessary product of the world he or she makes, or creates a "Jew" replete with "excesses" that reflect a truth about the subject. It is a fascinating argument and one that depends on dense and close readings of film sequences. The point that historians of National Socialism can take away from these readings is that it is not enough to say this film from 1940 and/or this society from 1940 were "anti-Semitic." It behooves us to explore how anti-Semitism was constructed and how it operated-textually and socially-what functions it might have served, and how its peculiar construction had similarly specific effects.
The core moment of Jew Suss is a rape scene in the finance minister's bedroom suite, and here, too, recent critiques identify a remarkable ambivalence obscured by the traditional reading, which held that this represents a crucial tenet of Nazism, the Blutschande fantasy of Jewish sexual predators defiling the race. Marcia Klotz points to a fact also raised by Rentschler in his chapter: the Austrian actor Ferdinand Marian, dangerous Other of many Nazi-era films, received in the wake of Jew Sass a spate of fan mail from smitten female spectators. Klotz focuses on the ways in which desire for the Other is semiotically produced in this infamous rape scene, and in two other Nazi films, to demonstrate a complexity of the relationship between the anti-Semitic ideology and the figure of the Jew that goes beyond demonization.25 Schulte-Sasse interprets data in ways that would support this view: ideology and culture such as that offered by Rentschler. He is more attuned to the deliberate ways in which ideologues with control over film production were able to communicate messages, and concerned with how Soviet history can therefore be reread through film history: how films "influenced the feelings of the lower classes in the revolution," mobilizing resentments and other politically charged emotions; how enemies were dehumanized and workers heroicized; that the postwar films demonstrated what he provocatively calls a "demonumentalization." He does maintain a distinction of politically charged historical films from what he calls "purely entertainment" features such as melodramas, but his ideological read on this distinction is subtle: the melodramas increase proportionally during the war as the need for escapism increases, and yet even these features can be examined for ideological content. Nonetheless, he confines his discussions to the ways in which the regime "used the medium consciously for political-ideological purposes," as a tool of the "Stalinist spectacle state," which appears to maintain control over the interplay of filmic text and audience in ways that escape Rentschler's ministry of illusion.32
Nazi cinema seems to be a boom field in German Studies departments. Rentschler's and Schulte-Sasse's books are in the company of other substantial work on Nazi entertainment cinema, including a special issue of the flagship theory journal of German studies, New German Critique.33 Many further articles and book chapters fit into this picture of a broader approach to cinematic effects and to ideological inscription, focusing, to varying degrees, on complicated production histories, on the relationship to a reviled and an envied Hollywood (the double and "negative double" of UFA's studio city, Babelsberg), the implications of the star system, and the way differences of gender and class, among other differences, inflected reception.34 Simultaneously, German historians have come to take the category of the everyday, popular culture and a differentiated image of ideological dissemination more seriously than they used to. These bodies of work may be seen as signs of the growing openness to interdisciplinarity, but they may also be markers of an increasing specialization. Nazi film analysis in the generation of Erwin Leiser and In teaching, of course, the questions have been posed differently. Since the 1940s, the dominant, even commonsense notion of the place of film in the history classroom has been that it is a more attractive medium for students than textbooks, but one must be vigilant that it represents past events in an accurate and responsible way.36 Discussions of the pedagogical use of film have continued to assume that movies draw students in more effectively than books but that historical accuracy may be compromised by the medium. In the twenty-first century, these dual assumptions remain familiar, and yet seem already dated, even quaint.
There are several reasons to think of this model as obsolete. First of all, the "culture wars" of the last fifteen years or so have brought not only professional historians and teachers but the general public as well to a heightened consciousness of the ways in which purportedly "neutral" or even "objective" representations necessarily serve some sort of agenda. This is not to say that filmmakers, audiences, or historians have abandoned a notion like "historical truth"; quite to the contrary: there is simply a general awareness of the status of all presentations of history as representations, as mediated entities with sources in and effects on present political perspectives. With its origins in education within the armed services during World War II, the first uses of film in the classroom were hardly less rooted in ideology than contemporary ones, but the relationship is no longer muted. As for the advantages of movies over books in capturing student interest, the age of "cyberconsciousness" has come to tax many young people's patience with fulllength films-especially black-and-white or subtitled ones but also independent American releases or even Hollywood features in genres they would not choose to watch on their own-no less than reading. Both of these developments, however, have a compounded result when the projector (unfortunately, it is more often a VCR) is switched on in the classroom: students identify their own role as that of critical spectators.
Yet the channeling of this self-consciously critical position is just where historians using film in the classroom have met the need for lessons from other disciplines. For at least a generation, educators have entertained the notion that students need training in how messages are constructed and transmitted in a film text, the goal being a sort of "visual literacy," or, as one author has put it, "students need not only to 'get the point' of a film; they also need to understand how it is 'gotten across.' 37 In spite of calls for sensitivity on these issues, it is safe to say that much, if not most, of the use of film by historians in class and in print (witness the balance of film reviews in this journal) has fallen back on the notion of the accuracy of portrayal in films representing the past.38 The reasons for this must ultimately have to do with how historians define the terrain of the discipline: matters of historical context are more at home in our analysis than matters and modes of reception. When Rentschler subtitles his book "Nazi Cinema and Its Afterlife," for example, he implicitly refuses to station these representations in a single frame of ideological transmission and predetermined reception but rather stakes a claim on the fluid filmic territory that includes movies' pre-histories as well as post-histories. SchulteSasse also troubles more static "historical" readings of Nazi films by situating them within eighteenth-century narrative contexts of melodrama at the same time as she extrapolates from them to transhistorical psychic epiphenomena. In sum, historians have known for a long time that our use of film should be informed by those who have been thinking about how messages are produced by, transmitted through, and 37 On the first level, we find the evolution of liberal doctrine in European thought; on the second, its concrete materialization in the development of institutions and environments such as the free press, the electoral system, and the market; finally, a discussion of liberalism is somehow partial if it does not consider the ways in which the ideology becomes internalized or active in its subjects-it must tackle the question of how subjects experience themselves as "free individuals."
The trained ear recognizes in this description a revision of Louis Althusser's famous excursus "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," where three levels are created out of the infrastructure or economic base, two levels of superstructure, including institutional apparatuses of state ideology, and finally, the level of sets of political, religious, ethical, and other ideas.57 That essay remains one of the most subtle treatments of the interrelations of devices of power and the self-consciousness (even constitution, Althusser argues) of individual subjects. Ideology "interpellates individuals as subjects," it "hails" them and causes them to recognize themselves in its call. Ideology, in this sense, is not a set of (false) ideas that are believed to a greater or lesser degree by historical subjects. Rather, it is the field in which those subjects are given identity; it is inseparable from their sense of where they stand in relation to others in society, as well as in relation to state and family.
While this last is clearly the terrain less charted by historians, it is the ground, as I have been suggesting, of the most innovative recent work in Nazi film studies. Yet, as we have seen, the relationships among ideology, popular movies, and viewing publics are also far messier to chart than one would think from rereading Sontag's "Fascinating Fascism" or any of a number of other works focusing on the allure of Nazi mass spectacle. Lutz Koepnick reevaluates the problem of Nazi popular culture in his essay "Fascist Aesthetics Revisited," where he employs Walter Benjamin's uncompleted work on the emergence of modern commodity culture (the Arcades project) to undo the assumption, drawn in part from Benjamin's own well-known and pithy phrase about the Nazi "aestheticization of politics," that Nazi culture was epitomized by the deindividuating, conformist, and unifying spectacles of Leni Riefenstahl's films and Albert Speer's monumental early to tell, but my own experience suggests that the youngest generation of cultural historians, namely our graduate students, have already overcome the disciplinary resistance I have been describing, and that future work in history is likely to incorporate more complex models of ideology than we have had at our disposal in the past. architecture.62 Such spectacular embodiments of ideological orthodoxy represented only half of the Nazi aesthetic program, which simultaneously followed a track of producing "seemingly unpolitical spaces of private commodity consumption" and "American-style consumerism," which posited itself as a realm of individuation and private desire, even as it co-opted these "to arrest and rechannel" them. 63 It is precisely this problem that was addressed in Miriam Hansen's 1991 work, Babel and Babylon, which attended to the problem of spectatorship in the context of American silent film, focusing on ideological questions associated with gender rather than with race. 65 Hansen turns to a complex conceptualization of the "public sphere" in order to breach the gap she identifies between two different kinds of "spectators" appearing in film scholarship: the first, an ideal subject, "somewhat abstract and ultimately passive," whose positioning is inscribed textually within the film work itself; and the second, the empirical moviegoer or "social viewer" who is assumed to be manipulated into certain positions. Addressing a problem of interdisciplinarity closely linked to the issues discussed here, Hansen writes of the "blind spots resulting from the increased specialization of both film theory and film history" and suggests that "the concept of the public sphere offers a theoretical matrix that encompasses different levels of inquiry and methodology."66 Apart from the fact that a significant book on American silent film might not be expected to fall within the frame of vision of historians of Nazi Germany, Hansen's solution is not likely to impress them. While the concept of the "public sphere" has certainly been engaged by historians, this has been at the level of actually existing social networks (free associations, professional affiliations, institutions), not as a "theoretical matrix," even one that is meant to mediate between empirical and semiotically constituted subjects. And yet it is precisely this mediation that has begun in the film scholarship discussed above, and the same work seems to constitute a call for interdisciplinarity, or to offer an invitation to historians to work toward such mediation from our own side of a formidable methodological barrier. The work Hansen and others have begun to do in terms of recovering the apparently lost but crucial experiences of past film publics is, after all, historical work-historians may be particularly adept at locating and interpreting the scant evidence necessary for this reconstruction. 67 It is conceivable that the sort of interdisciplinary rapport called for here is beyond our reach in an age where scholars consider themselves more open to work done in neighboring fields than ever before but where disciplinary practices are at the same time segregated from one another in more elusive and nefarious ways. In the face of the sheer volume of new work and its sophistication, a film scholar's new work on National Socialist mass media may seem remote even to a historian of everyday life in National Socialist Germany. It may, on the other hand, even be the case that these different disciplinary practices lead to incompatible conclusions about the relationship of state programs to mass consent and resistance, or about the nature of ideological formations as such. In other words, disciplines might well interfere with no less than they assist one another. Even if that is so, attentiveness to these precise tensions could be fruitful in unexpected ways in providing access to alternative conceptualizations of the relationship between film and history. 
